Abstract-We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent applications. Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications. To test this prediction, we use application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of promotions that carry with them reductions in examination time allocations. We find evidence demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality.
I. Introduction
I N recent years, the U.S. patent system has come under harsh criticism (Burk & Lemley, 2009 ). Critiques of the system have largely coalesced around one charge: the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is issuing too many invalid patents-patents on inventions that fail to meet the patentability requirements (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004) . In broad terms, a Patent Office that grants patents on inventions that are already known or represent only a trivial advancement over current scientific understanding will tend to burden society with the deadweight losses associated with monopoly protection without reaping the benefits of spurred innovation (Nordhaus, 1969) . In addition, invalidly issued patents can be utilized by nonpracticing entities or ''patent trolls'' to opportunistically extract licensing fees from innovators while also stunting follow-on discoveries in markets characterized by cumulative innovation (Scotchmer, 1991; Sampat & Williams, 2014; Galasso & Schankerman, 2014) .
Although commentators have suggested a plethora of reasons as to why the agency may be biased toward allowing patents, there exists little compelling evidence that any particular feature of the Patent Office actually induces it to overgrant patents.
1 This paper begins to rectify this deficiency by addressing one feature of the Patent Office that scholars have identified as likely to influence an examiner's decision to grant a patent: the time allotted to review a patent application (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004) . Because patent applications are legally presumed to comply with the statutory patentability requirements when filed, the burden of proving unpatentability rests with the agency. That is, a patent examiner who fails to explicitly set forth reasons as to why the application fails to meet the patentability standards must grant the patent. To the extent that examiners are given insufficient examination time, one might expect them to conduct limited reviews of applications, leaving them in a weaker position to identify proper bases of rejections and thereby leaving them in a position where they must grant patents at elevated rates. Much anecdotal evidence has been put forth to suggest that patent examiners indeed face binding examination time constraints, implicating such concerns.
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To more comprehensively test this hypothesis and challenge this anecdotal sentiment, we rely on the fact that examination times decrease on certain types of examiner promotion. Our basic strategy is to follow individual examiners throughout the course of their careers and track the evolution of their behavior as they experience promotions that diminish the amount of examination time at their disposal. Bolstering our ability to separate the effect of time allocations from other factors that may change with promotion is the fact that examiner promotions and pay raises come in several varieties, some that bear on examination times and some that do not. Our identification strategy is strengthened by the fact that the promotions of interest do not transpire lockstep with increases in years of experience, allowing us to decouple an experience effect from a promotion-of-interest effect, combined with the fact that applications are generally randomly assigned to examiners within technology groups.
To execute this empirical strategy, we estimate examiner fixed-effects specifications using microlevel data on over 1 million patent applications disposed of between 2002 and 2012, merged with examiner roster data. Our results suggest that as an examiner is given less time to review an application, the less active she becomes in searching for prior art, the less likely she becomes to make obviousness rejections (which are especially time intensive), and the more likely she becomes to grant the patent. Moreover, consistent with a prediction that the marginal patents issued as a result of these time constraints are of questionable legal validity, we find evidence that the promotions of interest are associated with a reduction in the frequency by which the inventors of U.S. issued patents are successful in securing patent protection for the relevant inventions at the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office-two agencies following essentially similar patentability requirements but expending greater resources per application than the United States does.
At first blush, it may not be surprising that the level of scrutiny afforded applications may, at some point, fall as allocated examination time becomes sufficiently strained. Importantly, our findings demonstrate that this is not merely a hypothetical scenario; examiners appear to be operating at the point where time constraints indeed bind.
3 Moreover, we demonstrate that the magnitude of the resulting impact on examiner granting tendencies is substantial. As examination time is cut roughly in half, our findings suggest that grant rates rise by as much as 10 to 19 percentage points, or by roughly 15% to 28%.
Despite a substantial literature in economics bearing on the patent system, 4 the administrative process by which patent rights are initially established has received scant attention. To date, only a handful of studies have explored the dynamics of the Patent Office, primarily by investigating the role of examiner heterogeneity in explaining the outcomes of the patenting process (Cockburn, Kortum, & Stern, 2003; Lichtman, 2004; Mann, 2014) . These groundbreaking studies raise concerns of an inefficient and inequitable Patent Office, demonstrating that application outcomes are largely a function of the examiners randomly assigned to applicants. Lemley and Sampat (2012) build on these initial efforts by beginning to unpack the sources behind this heterogeneity, estimating a monotonically increasing relationship between years of examiner experience and examiner grant rates. Given the natural connection between experience and promotion, their analysis, as they note, likely captures some aspects of the impact of allotted examination time on grant rates, though, absent data on examiner promotions, they are unable to decouple an experience effect from an examination-time-allotment effect. Moreover, their analysis is largely cross-sectional in nature, hindering their ability to distinguish between the effect of experience itself from either an examiner cohort effect or an examiner tenure effect. By tracking individual examiners over the course of a ten-year period, our fixedeffects specifications overcome these concerns. While our focus is on understanding the impact of reductions in allocated examination time and not necessarily on the independent impacts of examiner experience, we note that the imposition of examiner fixed effects produces an inverse-U shape in the relationship between grant rates and experience, as opposed to the monotonically increasing relationship documented in Lemley and Sampat (2012) .
In the next section, we provide a background on the patent examination process and discuss our theoretical predictions. In sections III and IV, we describe our data and empirical methodology. Section V presents results from our examiner fixed-effects analysis. Section VI concludes.
II. Background and Theory

A. Description of Examination Process
Every patent application filed with the Patent Office contains a specification, which describes the invention, and a set of claims, which defines the metes and bounds of the legal rights the applicant is seeking. Moreover, to satisfy applicants' duty of candor, each patent application discloses to the agency ''prior art,'' that is, previous patents, patent applications, or other publications that are material to the patentability of the relevant invention. Before it enters examination, an application is routed to an art unit, a group of eight to fifteen patent examiners who review applications in the same technological field. Upon arrival, the supervisory patent examiner (SPE) of that unit randomly assigns the application to a specific examiner.
The assigned examiner then assesses the patentability of the invention based on the criteria outlined in the Patent Act. Without making any reference to prior art, an examiner can deny a patent on the grounds that the claimed invention does not involve statutory subject matter, that the invention is not useful, or that the application fails to satisfy the disclosure requirements. In contrast, two other grounds for rejection-lack of novelty and obviousness-require the examiner to make a comparison of the claimed invention with the background art. Before making this assessment, the examiner conducts her own prior art search to supplement that disclosed by the patent applicant. Because lackof-novelty and obviousness rejections require this delicate prior art comparison (and underlying search), they are typically viewed as being more time-consuming to perform than non-art-based rejections. Obviousness rejections are likely the most time intensive (as confirmed by a series of telephone interviews with former SPEs). While novelty assessments require that examiners determine whether the claimed invention is covered by a single prior publication or patent, an obviousness determination requires an examiner to start with a prior art reference that covers only a portion of the invention and then piece together additional references or rely on what is known to one of ordinary skill 3 As discussed in the online appendix, the Patent Office's time allocations are effectuated by an examination quota system. Though our discussion focuses on the behavior of patent examiners at the U.S. Patent Office, the analysis contributes to a broader literature in personnel economics and human resource management on the productivity consequences of workload expectations and quotas and on timing associated with measuring employee output. Notable examples of such studies include Asch (1990) , Oyer (1998) , Courty and Marshke (2004) , Larkin (2014), and Chan (2016) . More broadly, this analysis is related to research on the distortionary effects of objective performance measures (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994) . 4 This literature has ranged from analyses on how to value patent rights (e.g., Pakes, 1986) , to studies exploring the effect of patents on innovation (e.g., Griliches, 1990) , to research on the ways in which patents are used and enforced once granted (e.g., Lanjouw & Lerner, 1997) .
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in the art in order to determine whether it would be ''obvious'' to modify any one of the cited prior art references to achieve the claimed invention.
In reality, this rejection and acceptance process is somewhat iterative in nature, often entailing some back and forth between the examiner and applicant. Though these details are not critical for the discussion to follow, we provide further background on this process in the online appendix (in addition to further information on the random assignment process).
B. Examination Time Allocations
On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only nineteen hours reviewing an application (Frakes & Wasserman, 2014) : reading the application, searching for prior art, comparing the prior art with the application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent applicant's arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant's attorney. If, over these hours, examiners are unable to conduct a sufficient search of prior art and articulate a proper basis of rejection, they are legally expected to allow applications. In light of this legal presumption of validity, one might predict that a further tightening of time constraints will cut the underlying search and evaluation period shorter and cause examiners to error even further on the side of allowing additional patents on the margin that might have otherwise been rejected if given sufficient time (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004; Lemley, 2001; Lemley & Sampat, 2012) .
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The Patent Office sets expectations regarding the amount of time examiners should spend on applications. 6 The number of hours allocated for review depends on both the technological field in which the examiner is working and her position in the general schedule (GS) pay scale. A patent examiner in a more complex field is provided more hours to review an application than an examiner of the same grade who is working in a less complex field. The higher the pay grade of an examiner within a technology area, the fewer number of hours the Patent Office extends to that examiner. A promotion to each subsequent pay grade is roughly equated to a 10% to 15% decrease in the number of allocated examination hours. As demonstrated by table A1 in the online appendix, by the time examiners reach GS-level 14, they are expected to review the same patent in approximately half the time they were allocated when operating at GS-level 7.
C. Promotion Process
Promotions at low pay grades often (though not always) occur within a year for examiners who meet their workload expectations with few errors, where errors are determined by reviewing some subset of the examiner's work product to see if, for instance, the examiner fails to include all grounds of rejections that should have been made or if she includes unreasonable rejections. In contrast, promotions at the high pay grades often require more time, as they generally involve the completion of additional testing or programs (e.g., passing written tests on patent law, practice, and procedure). Our empirical strategy largely treats promotion events as exogenous shocks to examination time allotments; however, we will demonstrate that the results are unlikely to be explained by reasonable theories of endogenous promotions (e.g., theories by which the PTO rewards elevated granting behavior).
While we contend that the most significant change subsequent to a promotion that bears on the examiner's decision to grant a patent application is the time allocated to review an application, there is, on promotion within GS-13 and to GS-14, also a change in the scrutiny of their work. Examiners at pay grades GS-13 and below must have their decisions reviewed by an examiner who has ''full signatory authority.'' Following an evaluation period while already at GS-13, an examiner may be extended ''partial signatory authority.'' Though not associated with a change in the GS level, this promotion does entail a decrease in the examination time allotted to the examiner and provides her with the ability to sign off independently on first office actions. Upon completing a second period of evaluation, a GS-13 partial-signatory patent examiner can be promoted to GS-14, a promotion that provides the examiner with full signatory authority or the right to sign off on all aspects of an application independently. The fact that variations in scrutiny of this nature do not occur on all examination-timereducing promotions is an important component to our identification strategy, as we discuss in section V.
7
To our knowledge, nothing else changes on GS-level promotions that would affect the manner in which examiners conduct their examinations. Through our review of examiner compensation materials made available by the Patent Office and interviews with former SPEs, we have determined that the basic structure of overtime and bonuses remains constant upon GS-level promotions, as do the ways in which examiners earn work credits.
D. Hypothesis
We assume examiners will conduct their examination practices in line with proper patentability standards when they are given sufficient time. However, tightening of time constraints (e.g., those arising through GS-level promotions) may force examiners of this otherwise competent disposition to decrease the degree to which they search prior art, decrease their ability to extend meaningful obviousness 5 That is, the legal landscape leads to a simple prediction that time constraints will produce a bias toward granting, as opposed to producing symmetrical noise in the examination process. We discuss the reasonableness of this prediction further in the online appendix.
6 These time allotments have largely remained unchanged since 1976 (discussed further in the online appendix). 7 Although the determinants of the signatory-authority promotions are similar to the others-meet workload expectations with few errors-the evaluation period is more extensive.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS rejections, and thus increase the propensity by which they grant patents.
III. Data
To facilitate the estimation of an examiner fixed-effects specification that can identify the effects of GS-level promotions while flexibly accounting for examiner heterogeneity, we collected individual application data over a span of years from the Patent Office's Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) database. These data cover 1.4 million utility patent applications that were filed on or after March 2001 and reached a final disposition (i.e., excluding ongoing applications) by July 2012. Among other things, these records include information on the outcome of the application, the name of the examiner charged with reviewing the application, and the basis of any rejection associated with the application (e.g., obviousness).
To determine the experience (in years) and the GS level for each of the 9,000 examiners represented in our analytical file, we match the examiner field in the PAIR data with a set of examiner rosters dating back to 1992 (received pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request). We treat the individual who did the majority of work on the application as the examiner charged with reviewing that application: (a) the nonsignatory examiner when both a nonsignatory and an examiner with signatory authority are associated with an application or (b) the signatory examiner when only one examiner is associated with an application.
To proxy for how intensively examiners search for prior art, we focus on the subsample of patents issued among our sample of applications and collect information on the share of prior art references listed in each issued patent that emanate from the examiner rather than the applicant (Lemley & Sampat, 2012) . 8 Previous investigations have reported that examiners are more likely to rely on prior art they discovered during their own search, rather than art disclosed by an applicant, to reject a patent application (Cotropia, Lemley, & Sampat, 2013) .
A final set of outcome measures considered in our analysis is meant to reflect on the quality of the patents issued by the Patent Office. As explained in section V, we assess these outcomes by looking at a set of inventions that sought protection at each of the U.S. Patent Office, the European Patent Office (EPO), and the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and observe whether patents issued in the United States were allowed or rejected at the EPO or JPO, or both. We obtained this information using the Triadic Patent Family database maintained by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The online appendix provides further specifics on the construction of the resulting data set. Table 1 provides summary statistics for key outcomes we explore. For instance, roughly 68% of the applications in this sample were granted, 9 while 72% of applications had at least one claim rejected during examination based on an argument of obviousness.
IV. Methodology
To explore how patent examination practices change on promotions that leave examiners with less examination time, we estimate the following:
where a indexes the individual application, i indexes the individual examiner, k indexes the technology associated with the application, and t indexes the year in which the application is disposed of by the examiner. GRANT aikt indicates whether the given application was allowed by the examiner. Year fixed effects are captured by k t . GS it represents a set of dummy variables capturing the incidence of the examiner assigned to the underlying application falling into each of the general schedule (GS) pay grade levels. GS it also includes separate categories for GS-13 without partial signatory authority and GS-13 with partial signatory authority, considering that this unique within-GS-level promotion carries with it reductions in examination time expectations. The ability to draw on a within-GS-level change in time allotments provides us with an opportunity to challenge the argument that the analysis may be purely driven by factors changing with GS-level promotions other than time allocations. Furthermore, included in some specifications, EXPER it captures a set of dummy variables for the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into a range of experience level categories, where experience is signified by the number of years (in two-year bins) at the time of the application's dis- position that the relevant examiner has been with the Patent Office. In a robustness check, we include a set of technology-by-year fixed effects, › kt (using the 37 technology subcategories set forth in Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001) , to alleviate concerns that examiners may be reassigned to different technologies as they ascend to higher pay grades and that such reallocation schemes may change over time. 10 Other specifications include various individual characteristics of the applications, X aikt , including the entity size status of the applicant (large versus small), the length of time between the filing and the disposition of the application (and its square), and the foreign priority status of the application (previous filings at the EPO and JPO).
Importantly, a set of examiner fixed effects is captured by c i . Such fixed effects help address concerns that more experienced examiners and higher GS-level examiners are fundamentally different from their more junior counterparts, for reasons beyond mere differences in seniority and promotion levels-for example, concerns that examiners who have reached higher grade levels and thus who have been successful in attaining promotions may be those with a stronger inherent disposition toward granting in the first place.
V. Results
A. Grant-Rate Analysis
Primary results. In column 1 of table 2 (depicted in figure A1 of the online appendix), we present results from a regression of the incidence of an application being granted on a set of dummy variables capturing each of the relevant examiner pay grades, in addition to a set of year fixed effects and examiner fixed effects. 11 The results demonstrate that grant rates increase with each examination-timereducing promotion, including increases as examiners initially ascend to GS-13 and subsequently to GS-13 with partial signatory authority. We find that as examiners move from GS-7 to GS-9, they increase their grant rates by 3.8 percentage points (roughly 6%). As they ascend even higher Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. Technology-by-year effects are based on the 37 Hall et al. (2001) technology subcategories, while the technology fixed effects used in column 2 are based on Patent Office classes. Column 2 also includes technology class-year-specific application filing counts as a covariate.
10 Technology-year fixed effects also address concerns that the Patent Office may execute more promotions during times in which application filings are elevated in particular technologies, events that may also affect observed grant rates. We alternatively alleviate this concern in column 2 of table 2 by estimating specifications that include technology-yearspecific filing counts as a control while using the finer-grained Patent Office classes as the basis for technology groupings (along with class fixed effects).
11 Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level to account for autocorrelation over time in examiner-specific residuals. In unreported regressions, we also cluster by technology. Estimated standard errors rise only slightly in this instance (to an inconsequential degree).
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS in ranks and thus receive less and less time to review applications, this increase in grant rates continues monotonically until the point at which their grant rate at GS-level 14 is 18.6 percentage points (28%) higher than it was when they were at GS-7. Essential to our analysis is the separation of the effects stemming from grade-level promotions and the acquisition of additional years of experience within the agency. Note from the outset that examiners do not always receive promotions lockstep with experience, allowing us to separately identify these forces. This is especially true from GS-12 onward, when examiners begin to routinely spend multiple years (to varying degrees) at the respective grade.
12 By including year fixed effects in a specification with examiner fixed effects, this initial specification is identifying the impacts of GS-level changes while accounting for the influence of individual examiners moving across experience levels (in year increments). This observation stems from the well-known point (Heckman & Robb, 1985) that age (experience) effects have become determined when one has estimated both year effects and cohort effects (which derive from individual effects).
13 These findings demonstrate a distinct jump in grant rates that occurs upon GS-level promotion independent of any pattern of grant rates that examiners exhibit over years of experience themselves (which may arise under a range of theories).
Considering that the key channel by which the act of promotion may theoretically affect subsequent examination behavior stems from its effect on the time allotted for examination (as already discussed), these results provide greater confidence that time constraints may be binding on examiners and that tightening such constraints may leave examiners with less time to adequately challenge the patentability of applications.
14 We further support this contention below with even richer methods of decoupling experience from promotions and with investigations into examiner search efforts and rejection patterns.
Beforehand, however, we discuss the relationship that we nonetheless estimate between grant rates and an increase in examiner experience in years. Though our focus is mainly on examination time allocations, it would be of interest to identify the effects of experience independently in order to more fully evaluate the determinants of examiner behavior. While the initial specification estimated in column 1 of table 2 does not allow us to distinguish the contribution of year effects from experience effects (while, as above, it does account for both), we take various steps below to achieve this separation.
Experience effects. Generally it is not possible to distinguish year effects from annual experience effects in specifications that include individual examiner intercepts, absent additional normalization restrictions on the parameterization of the year or experience effects that break the identity between them. In our primary approach to isolating the independent impacts of experience, we estimate specifications that achieve the necessary restrictions by specifying examiner experience dummies into two-year blocks: 0-1 years of experience, 2-3 years of experience, and so on.
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In column 3 of table 2 (depicted in figure A2 of the online appendix), we present results from this exercise, presenting the GS-level and experience dummy coefficients while leaving year effects as a nuisance control. The pattern of estimated coefficients suggests an inverse-U relationship between examiner experience (in years) and grant rates. Grant rates do increase by close to 8 percentage points as an examiner moves from 0-1 to 2-3 years of experience. The grant rate effectively stays at this level through 5 years of experience and thereafter begins to fall, until the point at which the grant rate at 14 or more years of experience is identical to the 0-1 year experience level.
These inverse-U-shaped findings build on Lemley and Sampat's (2012) prior observation that grant rates increase monotonically with experience in years. Lemley and Sampat acknowledge the possibility that the monotonic relationship they estimate does not represent a true experience effect but instead captures either the promotion-related time-allocation story of focus in our analysis or an alternative story of selective retention-that is, a tenure effect in which senior examiners who elect to stay at the Patent Office differ fundamentally from those that leave the office earlier. Lacking data on examiner GS levels and observing only a cross-section of applications at a point in time, Lemley and Sampat are unable to fully rule out these possibilities, though they do include some examiner tenure controls to alleviate selective retention concerns. Though not emphasized in their analysis, the cross-sectional sampling frame also leaves them unable to separate the effect of gaining experience in years-a true experience effect-from an examiner cohort effect, where this latter influence captures fundamental differences in examination behavior (perhaps due to initial training or cultural idiosyncrasies) among those who began their careers with the Patent Office in different calendar years.
By controlling for examiner GS levels and individual examiner effects, we are, unlike the prior literature, able to 12 Over 75% of examiners who have reached GS-14 stay at that grade level over a year, with over 20% staying for at least eight years.
13 Behind this problem is the identity: calendar year ¼ year of birth (cohort) þ age.
14 We acknowledge that some examiners may attempt to increase their chances of promotion by granting more permissively as a general matter of course (e.g., in light of the financial interests of the agency in overgranting patents; Frakes & Wasserman, 2013) . For a story of this nature to explain the results, in light of the imposition of examiner fixed effects, it would have to be the case that promotion-seeking behavior elevates in intensity with each promotion. Cutting against this theory are the drops in grant rates that we observe within particular GS levels over time, as we discuss below.
15 By specifying experience groups in this manner, it is no longer the case that experience dummies would be perfectly collinear with year dummies as would be the case with both yearly experience group dummies and year effects. In the online appendix, we provide further discussion on the ability of this approach to achieve the required separation.
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target the association between examiner experience and grant rates while accounting for cohort, tenure, and promotionrelated effects. In the online appendix, we demonstrate that the monotonic relationship between experience and grant rates documented by Lemley and Sampat is likely driven by promotion-related time allocation effects and examiner cohort effects. Once controlling for these other influences, experience effects themselves appear to follow the inverse-U shape depicted in column 3 of table 2.
Within-grade experience effects. In this section, we take an alternative approach to separating grade-level effects from experience effects. Instead of simply estimating the overall impacts of being at the Patent Office for a given number of years, we nest experience years within grade levels. In other words, we estimate specifications that include a series of dummy variables capturing the presence of specific years within specific grade levels (e.g., 0-1 years in GS-13, 2-3 years in GS-13). This approach allows us to more comprehensively follow the course of a hypothetical examiner over the various stages of a career and thus better visualize the independent and discontinuous impacts of examination-time-reducing promotions. For this analysis, we focus only on examiners in GS-12 and above, considering that the majority (though not all) of those within lower grade levels achieve promotions within their first year at those grades, providing little ability to reliably track the evolution of grant rates over years while at GS-7, GS-9, or GS-11. Figure 1 plots the results of this exercise, presenting the coefficients of each of these separate dummy variables, with the 0-1 year period at GS-12 serving as the omitted reference group. The results further solidify the contention that examination practices change with the occurrence of career events that are associated with reductions in the time allocated to examiners. With each such promotion, the observed grant rate jumps. Importantly, these promotionlevel increases do not appear to be mere reflections of continuing trends in grant rates over the duration of an examiner's tenure at the specific grades, which might otherwise suggest a simple experience-level story or might otherwise suggest a selection story in which the Patent Office elects to promote examiners at points in time in which the examiners begin to grant at elevated rates. 16 Consider, for instance, GS-level 14, a level in which examiners spend on average 4.5 years after reaching it. While the grant rate jumps distinctly once one enters this GS level (to a degree that is 8 percentage points higher than the reference period), the grant rate actually begins to fall then. In the period represented by her ninth year and beyond at GS-14, her grant rate is over 5 percentage points below the initial GS-14 grant rate. If the grant rate had incrementally continued to rise over such years, especially at levels commensurate with those experienced with grade-level changes, it would instill less confidence in an interpretation of the results as emanating from reductions in the amount of time at the disposal of examiners.
Indeed, if anything, this picture depicts a story in which experience alone ultimately leads to a reduction in granting tendencies, as opposed to the monotonically increasing relationship observed between grade levels and grant rates (further illuminating the various forces underlying the positive relationship found in Lemley & Sampat, 2012 In the specification underlying this figure, we regress a dummy variable indicating a granted application on a series of dummy variables capturing specific experience years within each grade level. Specifications include both examiner and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level. 16 In the online appendix, we provide even further support against the possibility that the Patent Office elects to promote given examiners once their grant rates hit certain elevated points, a possibility that could otherwise explain the initial findings in table 2. Specifically, we find that examiners who are promoted quickly within the agency, and whose work appears to be most valued by the Patent Office, actually have lower inherent grant rates relative to those who rise more slowly in the ranks.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS grant rates ultimately begin to fall over time as one stays within the respective category long enough. These drops in grant rates with experience are periodically corrected by successive promotions of the sort that leave examiners with diminished examination time. This is perhaps consistent with a story in which examiners learn over time how to form more effective bases of rejection (thus contributing to falling grant rates), only to have this learning process interrupted by occasional promotions that diminish the amount of time they have to derive such rejections (reelevating grant rates). In discussing figure 1, it also bears mentioning that examiners may continue to receive salary increases throughout their tenure at each GS level (as discussed in the online appendix). The presence of such alternative types of promotions-that is, within-GS-level increases in salary that are tied only to experience-are helpful for our analysis in providing support against an argument that the findings presented in table 2 are attributable merely to any increases in income associated with GS-level promotions (if that were the case, grant rates would tend to rise throughout all of figure 1).
Caveats. To be sure, our ability to separately identify GS-level effects and experience effects is facilitated by examiners who happen to stay within GS levels for some time before being promoted. For low GS levels, this group of examiners is more select. It is thus unclear whether the results we estimate at the low-GS levels truly generalize to the quick risers within the agency. Nonetheless, the same pattern of grant rate increases with promotion is present as we proceed to higher and higher grade levels, where it is more common for examiners to spend multiple years within given GS levels, lending some confidence to a more general story.
Similar concerns arise for the case of the within-GSlevel declines in grant rates over time observed in figure 1. After all, only a small minority of examiners at GS-12 and GS-13 stay at those grades over the full course of years depicted. Perhaps the most conservative way to interpret our results is that with respect to at least some examinersthose who happen to achieve promotions relatively more slowly-the effects of increased temporal experience on grant rates appear to generally be negative. For examiners who experience early promotions more rapidly, it is difficult to say what role experience plays, as distinct from GSlevel changes, during these early years. Nonetheless, such quick risers stay for a long time at GS-14, at which point their grant rates do indeed fall with more years of experience.
Sample balance. A related concern stems from the sample imbalance in the above specifications. Though examiners in our sample experience on average nearly four of the seven possible promotions depicted in table 2 and though the relevant GS-level coefficients are identified by actual within-examiner changes in grade levels for at least some subset of examiners, the underlying specification does not follow all examiners throughout each of the indicated grade levels. Nonetheless, in the online appendix, we demonstrate the robustness of these findings to the estimation of a balanced sample analog to the specifications estimated in table 2. Figure A5 in the online appendix also presents a balanced sample analog to the dynamic specification estimated in figure 1 ; this alternative figure arguably presents even clearer evidence of a decline in grant rates over time that is interrupted by grade-level promotions.
Other robustness checks and alternative specifications. We further challenge the grant-rate results through a range of additional robustness exercises.
Covariates and technology effects. We demonstrate in column 4 of table 2 that the findings remain nearly unchanged when we include certain application-level controls (indicated in section IV), along with the inclusion of technology-by-year fixed effects. Further, in the online appendix, we estimate specifications identical to that underlying column 1 of table 2 separately for each of the 37 different Hall et al. (2001) technology subcategories. This exercise demonstrates that the increase in grant rates associated with the promotions of interest manifests itself in each of the 37 different technologies (as opposed to being driven by a small subset of technologies). 17 As such, time constraints appear to be binding across the board within the agency.
Falsification exercise. In table A11 of the online appendix, we conduct a falsification test in which we estimate the relationship between the promotions of interest and two characteristics of the underlying application with respect to which the examiner has no ability to alter (and with respect to which we have data): (a) whether the incoming application was previously filed with the EPO and JPO and (b) whether the applicant is a large or small entity (as such terms are used by the Patent Office to set application fees). We find no meaningful or statistically significant changes in foreign priority rates as examiners ascend grade levels. From GS-level 11 onward, we find that the incidence of a large-entity applicant remains virtually flat (with only a minor increase in this incidence as examiners move from GS-7 to GS-9 and then from GS-9 to GS-11). These results lend further confidence to the contention that applications are randomly sorted, especially in the grade levels of most interest for our analysis (where it becomes easier to separate experience effects from grade-level effects).
GS-15 examiners. We exclude the few applications examined by GS-15 examiners from the primary analysis (less than 3% of all applications). While published, official records regarding the scaling of time allotments upon pro-motions suggest that GS-15 examiners should be given less time than GS-14 examiners to review applications, the examiner-level time allotment information we received from the Patent Office suggested that this may not be the case for many of the GS-15 examiners. Despite this discrepancy, we estimate specifications in the online appendix that include GS-15-examined applications and assume that GS-15 examiners are indeed given less time for review, as the official schedules suggest they should. As shown in the online appendix, we continue to estimate the same pattern of results with this inclusion.
18
B. Analysis of Rejection Patterns
Obviousness. A key prediction set forth above is that examiners will begin to perform fewer and fewer rejections based on the argument that the proposed claims are obvious-an especially time-intensive analysis-upon the occurrence of promotions that leave them with less and less allocated examination time. We now attempt to illuminate the grant rate findings by testing this secondary hypothesis and exploring the effects of promotions on the incidence of obviousness rejections among the underlying applications.
One limitation of the data that we collected for this analysis, as novel as it is, is that we capture the incidence of any obviousness rejection without knowing the full force of such rejection. Does it simply cover one claim or many claims? Is it easy to overcome or difficult? Such questions cannot be adequately resolved with the data collected. With this limitation in mind, we first take an approach where we do not view obviousness rejections in an absolute sense but instead specify the dependent variable as the ratio of obviousness rejections to total rejections, more specifically the incidence of an obviousness rejection divided by the sum of the incidence of the following types of rejections: obviousness, lack of novelty, lack of patentable subject matter/utility, and failure to satisfy the disclosure requirements. Though each of the variables underlying this ratio suffers from the above limitation, this measure at least provides us with a sense of the relative effort spent on obviousness rejections. In columns 1 and 2 of table 3, we replicate the basic specifications estimated in table 2 but use this obviousness share measure as the dependent variable. The results depict a monotonically strengthening decline in this obviousness rejection share upon the promotions of interest, suggesting a story in which examiners begin to spend less and less of their effort on time-intensive obviousness ana- Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation in columns 1 and 2 is a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. Each observation in columns 3 and 4 is from a subset of applications that culminate in an issued patent.
18 The online appendix presents results of certain additional robustness checks, including, among others, the estimation of specifications that control for the incidence of a request-for-continued examination (RCE) associated with the application.
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Figures A15 to A17 of the online appendix plot trends over GS-level increases in the incidence of each type of rejection separately, further illuminating the pattern of results presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 3. As depicted in these figures, the relative decline in the obviousness rejection share appears to be driven by an absolute decline in the obviousness rejection incidence (from GS-11 onward) and a leveling out over GS levels in the incidence of rejections among the remaining bases of rejections. In figure 2 , we follow the approach of figure 1 and track how the absolute incidence of obviousness rejections evolves as an examiner increases in tenure over time within particular grades. Complementing the observation in figure 1 of jumps in grant rates upon promotions, we observe corresponding drops at such moments in obviousness rejection efforts. Further complementing figure 1, which demonstrates a general trend to decrease grant rates over time within given grade levels, figure 2 also demonstrates a corresponding tendency over the time dimension to increase the rate of obviousness rejections. As before, this may be consistent with a learning story in which examiners get better and better at forming obviousness determinations over time. Periodically, however, examiners will experience promotions that cut short the time they have to make such rejections, at which moments the rates by which they are able to form obviousness rejections fall back down.
Implications of obviousness analysis: alternative interpretations. As discussed in section II, once an examiner reaches the second GS-13 classification and GS-level 14, she attains more authority of her own to sign off on decisions, potentially experiencing a decline in the level of scrutiny placed on her by superiors. One may be concerned that the increase in grant rates observed with promotion are merely a reflection of this lightening of scrutiny (given a possible underlying inclination to shirk on search scrutiny). The fact that this pattern of increasing granting tendencies occurs over earlier promotions, which do not come with the formal extension of greater authority, lends support to the idea that the documented pattern of results may not simply arise from changes in the degree of oversight. We acknowledge, however, the possibility of informal lightening of scrutiny as examiners are promoted at earlier grades, which might give way to this alternative interpretation of the findings.
Nevertheless, one may take our findings as being more consistent with increasing time constraints rather than a lightening of scrutiny for several reasons. First, as shown in the online appendix, the basis of rejection that falls the most on grade-level changes relates to the obviousness of the application-the rejection type that is most sensitive to the amount of time allocated to examiners. With respect to the other rejection types (e.g., patentable subject matter, written description, and novelty), we actually do not observe a decline in grant rates with the promotions of interest at all (only a leveling out). If examiners are truly shirking work when they are promoted, it is less clear why obviousness rejections would receive the emphasis of their reduced attention. The observed pattern is arguably more consistent with time constraints.
Second, consider the results in figure 1 , which suggest that an examiner's grant rate initially increases with promotion and then falls with each additional year the examiner spends at the grade level in question. If these findings were driven by a lightening of informal scrutiny, supervisors would arguably have to lessen their review of an examiner's This figure replicates that of figure 1 except that it replaces the incidence of an application being granted with the incidence of an application experiencing an obviousness rejection as the dependent variable.
ARE EXAMINNER TIME ALLOCATIONS INDUCING INVALID PATENT GRANTS?
work immediately on promotion but then slowly increase their review as the examiner garners more experience within a particular grade level. This is perhaps less plausible than the binding time constraint explanation-that an examiner's grant rate increases with promotion and then gradually decreases as she learns to adjust to her new time allocation.
C. Investigation of Prior Art Citations
To further illuminate whether the results we present are a reflection of reduced examination effort stemming from binding examination time constraints, we next estimate the relationship between GS levels and the share of total priorart citations listed in the final patent that derive from the examiner as opposed to the applicant, a proxy for the search effort of the examiner. In columns 3 and 4 of table 3, we estimate this relationship over the full sample of patents issued between 2002 and 2012. This specification is, of course, somewhat compromised by the fact that it relies only on issued patents, the incidence of which we already know (as above) is likely to increase on the promotions of interest, leading to possible selection concerns. With this caveat in mind, we note that the findings parallel those of the obviousness-rejection analysis.
D. Assessment of Marginal Nature of Increased Grants
Our analysis suggests that as time constraints tighten, examiners will grant some patents that they might have otherwise rejected if given sufficient time. Assuming an otherwise competent examination process, these additional patent grants should be of marginally questionable validity. To evaluate this prediction, we rely on the fact that many U.S. applicants file for patent protection with the EPO and the JPO, two offices that are known to invest substantially more resources per application in the examination process while having essentially similar patentability standards (Picard & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011) . Accordingly, we consider the sample of issued patents in which the relevant U.S. applicant also sought protection at the EPO and the JPO and follow Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Lemley and Sampat (2012) in using outcomes at these foreign offices as a benchmark (albeit an imperfect one) to assess what the outcome at the U.S. Patent Office would have been (at least generally) if the U.S. examiners were given more time and resources to determine the patentability of the relevant invention.
To assess the quality of these marginal patent issuances, we consider the full sample of patents that were issued in the United States and sought protection in the EPO and the JPO and then estimate how the mean incidence of such patents also being granted by the EPO (or JPO) changes as examiners experience the examination time-reducing promotions of interest. The analysis has demonstrated that the pool of issued patents will rise with such promotions. To the extent that average quality levels among the set of issued patents fall will these events, it must be the case that the marginal patents being issued as a result of these promotions are of increasingly below average quality (Frakes, 2013) . We test for this response in table 4.
Consistent with expectations, we estimate monotonically (generally) declining patterns of this nature, suggestive of marginal patent issuances of weakening validity. Relative to the patents issued at GS-7, the patents issued at GS-14 are 7 percentage points (roughly 16%) less likely to be allowed by both the EPO and the JPO (when using success at both foreign offices to signify the strongest benchmark of quality). Whether those additional patent grants arising from such promotions have truly crossed the invalidity threshold, the evidence suggests that they are at least of a more questionable nature than the typical issuance.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
A. Summary and Magnitude of Findings
Our analysis finds that as examiners are given less time to review applications upon certain types of promotions, the less prior art they cite, the less likely they are to make timeconsuming obviousness rejections, and the more likely they are to grant patents. Moreover, our evidence suggests that these marginally issued patents are of weaker-than-average quality. These findings demonstrate that a factor other than the true patentability of applications may be a determinant of granting decisions and may be pushing grant rates considerably upward. Combining the estimated impacts of GSlevel changes on grant rates depicted in table 2 with the distribution of applications examined across the various grade levels, as depicted in table A2 in the online appendix, our analysis implies that if all examiners were allocated as many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent Office's overall grant rate would fall by roughly 14 percentage points (or 20%), amounting to roughly 40,000 fewer patents issued per year.
B. Quality/Production Trade-Off Basic framework. Increasing the number of hours allotted to examiners in such a manner would not be without consequence. To understand the trade-offs at play here, consider a Patent Office with the following objective function:
where x t is the number of applications processed by the agency at time t, g t is the rate by which the agency grants applications at time t, and d t is the rate by which the agency would grant applications if given sufficient time to properly follow the patentability standards. First, we assume that V 0 (x t ) > 0-that the Patent Office's utility is enhanced the greater it is able to satisfy its obligation to process incoming 560 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS applications. It could of course decline to satisfy all such obligations immediately and review some applications at a later date; however, pursuant to the above objective function, the Patent Office will discount a delayed review (b Àt ). That is, we assume that the agency values a timely review of all incoming applications. Long patent delays, after all, can postpone the deployment of valuable inventions to the marketplace and increase uncertainty surrounding the rights of potential patents, which in turn limit a company's ability to license or engage in related activity.
As theorized above (and as supported by the empirical analysis), g t À d t increases as the time allocated to review an individual application in year t, a t , decreases. In other words, time constraints lead to a bias in the Patent Office's granting practices.
19 Moreover, consistent with the remarks in section I, we assume that the agency disvalues the presence of any such bias: V 0 ðg t À d t Þ < 0. Finally, it is critical to note that the Patent Office will maximize this objective function subject to a resource constraint that must be satisfied at each time period (according to a fixed budget, R): R t ! a t h t x t , Vt where h t equals the cost per hour of examination time to the agency. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether the agency is properly optimizing its constrained objectives with its choice over how many hours to allocate to each individual application; rather, we simply set forth this structure in order to demonstrate the trade-offs associated with this choice. The Patent Office may increase the amount of time, a, allocated to review given applications in an attempt to reduce its grant bias (i.e., bring g t closer to d t ) and thereby increase its utility, V. However, to the extent that the budget constraint binds (and in light of the fixed R), it can be readily shown that an increase in a in period t must come at the expense of a reduction in the number of applications processed in period t, x, a development that would inhibit the objectives of the Patent Office and result in the harms associated with delayed examinations.
20
The agency's choice over how many hours to extend to examiners implicates a possible trade-off between the benefits of improved patent quality and the harms of reduced examination capacity. Our empirical analysis suggests that the specified budget constraint may indeed be binding and that this trade-off is in action. However, our analysis does Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is from the sample of applications that (a) were filed after March 2001 and (b) reached a final disposition and were published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. The sample is further restricted to applications that actually culminated in a patent grant and whose underlying inventors also sought patent protection at the JPO and EPO. not necessarily demonstrate that the way in which the Patent Office executes this trade-off is suboptimal given its budgetary limitations. Of course, to the extent that the agency overly favors examination capacity concerns in performing this calculus (beyond the weight that may be applied to such concerns by a social planner), which is possible given that application throughput (and associated backlog) is a more highly visible and easily measured feature of the agency relative to the quality of its review (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) , the Patent Office's execution of this trade-off may indeed deviate from optimalitythat is, it may be setting examination time allotments insufficiently low. 21 Examiner heterogeneity in productivity. Figure 1 suggests that examiners may undergo productivity gains as they accumulate experience. That is, for a given time allotment, a, examiners may be able to bring g t closer to d t as they spend more time at the agency. Considering these gains, the agency may desire to set different time allocations for examiners with different levels of productivity (e.g., provide less time to examiners with experience). 22 This framework can be readily extended to account for examiner heterogeneity along such lines, such that the Patent Office will maximize where m signifies different productivity groups. In the unitary examiner framework set forth above, increases in application throughput, x, could come only at the expense of driving grant rates above their unbiased point, d (i.e., at the expense of quality), when constraints bind. If all examiners experienced productivity gains, one might expect to observe a relaxation of the budget constraint and a resulting first-order condition in which examination quality is marginally less compromised-a reduction in grant rates. If only some examiners experience productivity gains, the Patent Office may experience similar relief and set time allocations such that its overall grant rate goes down. However, without knowing more about the structure of the Patent Office's objective function, it is difficult to assess how any such desired quality improvements should be split among the different productivity types; in other words, it is difficult to evaluate the optimality of the relationship between GS levels and grant rates estimated in table 2. Nonetheless, we emphasize that the relationship we do observe is, interestingly, one in which grant rates increase strongly as examiners experience time-allocation adjustments associated with productivity gains. To the extent that the solution to this maximization problem is one in which grant rates are either expected to fall with time-allocation adjustments on seniority or stay roughly flat, which might be desirable in the event that we place sufficient value on horizontal equity, these results would suggest that the examination time schedule is not calibrated optimally (or equitably) to reflect actual productivity improvements.
C. Ex Ante, Ex Post Investment in Quality
The welfare losses associated with the issuances of more invalid patents on the margin may not be as large as originally envisioned to the extent the courts may subsequently correct this outcome and invalidate these patents (albeit with a delay). Of course, this legal backdrop is not without welfare consequences of its own. Litigation, when it arises, carries substantial administrative expenses, lawyer fees, and related costs. One must also consider the trade-off between investing greater resources in the agency versus relying on the litigation process to screen out invalid patents.
Any such analysis will likely involve an assessment of the relative administrative expenses associated with these separate systems. Though far more expensive on a per unit basis, litigation ultimately arises in the case of a small fraction of those applications before the Patent Office. Consider the decision to increase the amount of examination time given to examiners. Though carrying added payroll expenses, this policy decision may decrease the number of invalid patents that the agency issues and potentially reduce the number of lawsuits moving forward. Making assumptions about the various parameters underlying this analysis, Lemley (2001) suggests that increasing the hours to review applications may not be cost effective. Our analysis affords us an opportunity to revisit Lemley's claim. In the online appendix, we apply certain conservative assumptions and perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation, supported by novel estimates of the reduction in legal challenges that may result from increasing examination hours, demonstrating that the savings in future litigation costs associated with giving examiners additional time per application more than outweigh the added payroll expenses.
At the least, this exercise suggests that the presence of the courts and the fact that they are invoked in only rare cases may not render inconsequential the decision as to how many examination hours to extend to patent examiners.
